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ABSTRACT 
Shortly after Marine forces landed in Vietnam in March, 1965, leaders in the field began 
experimenting with pacification/combined action.  Although this concept went directly 
against the military strategy of the top leaders, which involved unlimited combat 
operations, four Combined Action Platoons were formed into a Combined Action 
Company in the summer of 1965.   
The Marine Corps Combined Action Program was viewed by many as one of the 
only successful pacification programs conducted in South Vietnam during the Vietnam 
War.  The CAP concept in Vietnam combined a squad of Marines and a platoon of South 
Vietnamese Popular Forces to assist villages in resisting VC influence.  By combining 
forces and living inside the villages, the Marines believed they could win the “hearts and 
minds” of the villagers. 
 Although they may not have been aware that the science of social influence even 
existed, the Marines who were part of the CAP used several social influence tactics in 
their effort to gain the trust of the villagers and deny influence attempts from the VC.  
What they accomplished by chance should not be lost to history; it should be studied 
within the context of established social influence theory so future operations may benefit 
from their experience.   
This study views the Combined Action Program conducted by the U.S. Marines in 
South Vietnam through a lens of the science of social influence.  A social influence 
analysis is conducted using cognitive Centers of Gravity and specific social influence 
tactics.  The analysis results provide an insight into which social influence tactics can be 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 1950, the U.S. maintained a presence in Vietnam in an effort to stop 
the communist government in the North from taking over the anti-communist regime in 
the South.  This presence consisted of mostly advisors, some high level military, yet no 
Marine ground forces.1  That changed in 1965.  Shortly after Marine forces landed in 
Vietnam in March of that year, leaders in the field began experimenting with 
pacification/combined action.2  Although this concept went directly against the strategy 
of the top leaders of the military (including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 
and Chief of Staff of the Army), which involved unlimited combat operations3, four 
Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) were formed into a Combined Action Company 
(CAC) in the summer of 1965.   
The Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) was viewed by many as one 
of the only successful pacification programs conducted in South Vietnam during the 
Vietnam War.4  Pacification is defined as the acceptance of the government by the people 
and their cooperation with government forces.  In South Vietnam, a village would be 
considered pacified once it was able to resist the influence of the Viet Cong (VC), 
provide its own security, and support the Government of South Vietnam (GVN).       
The CAP concept in Vietnam combined a squad of Marines and a platoon of 
South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PFs) to assist villages in resisting VC influence.  By 
combining forces and living inside the villages, the Marines believed they could win the 
“hearts and minds” of the villagers and gain intelligence on the movement of VC in 
return for security. 
                                                 
1 Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The landing and the buildup, 1965 (Dept. of Defense, 
Navy Dept., 1978), xi. 
2 Ibid., 135. 
3 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 2005), 152. 
4 Ibid., 157. 
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Although they may not have been aware that the science of social influence even 
existed, the Lieutenants, Sergeants, and other Marines who were part of the CAP used 
several social influence tactics in order to gain the trust of the villagers and deny 
influence attempts from the VC.  What they accomplished by chance should not be lost to 
history; it should be studied within the context of established social influence theory so 
future operations may benefit from their experience.   
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine what social influence tactics are 
effective to use during military operations, with a focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations.  This thesis is a Social Influence Analysis (SIA)5 to study operations 
conducted between the U.S. Marines and the VC in South Vietnam from 1965–1970.   
The Science of Social Influence has used experiments, case studies, surveys, and 
other research designs to develop an understanding of conditions under which social 
influence is effective.  When conducted on historical data, an SIA can provide insight 
into what social influence tactics were or were not effective, and then be applied to 
similar situations in the future.  In 2005, Anthony Pratkanis and Doug Shadel conducted 
an SIA of how con criminals use social influence to perpetrate their crimes.  This SIA 
resulted in policy recommendations and interventions that have been empirically shown 
to decrease victimization rates.6  An SIA will be used here to answer the following 
questions 
1. Primary Research Questions 
An understanding of which influence Centers of Gravity (COGs) should be the 
focus during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations could help military and civilian 
leaders reduce the time engaged in a conflict and increase the effectiveness of their 
                                                 




influence campaign.  The primary research question of this thesis is which COGs7 are 
most relevant to conducting a social influence campaign against an insurgency?         
Military leaders must have the necessary tools to be successful, whether they are 
fighting to destroy an enemy or fighting to wins the hearts and minds of a population.  
Identifying which specific social influence tactics work, and under what conditions, will 
help leaders planning for COIN operations to be more efficient when choosing which 
tactics should be included in their influence campaigns.  A second primary question is 
when do specific social influence tactics work in an operational environment and which 
produce the most desired results?       
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Prior to answering the primary research questions, the research must answer a few 
preliminary questions.  They are: 
What was the CAP?     
Was the CAP successful?   
What social influence tactics used by the CAP Marines can be identified through 
a case study on the CAP, and under what conditions should they be attempted or 
avoided?   
C. SCOPE 
This thesis will discuss the history of the CAP concept and its implementation in 
South Vietnam from 1965–1970, and then use the science of social influence to conduct 
an SIA.  As part of the SIA, a Centers of Gravity (COG) analysis of the CAP will be 
conducted using the COGs sited by Anthony Pratkanis in his work Public Diplomacy in 
International Conflicts.  It will then analyze the use of several documented and 
experimentally tested social influence tactics in an effort to determine their applicability 
to COIN operations.  The results are intended to provide military commanders involved 
                                                 
7 Note: For the purpose of this thesis, the COGs used are not traditional COGs (i.e., Clauswitzian); 
rather, they are COGs proposed by Anthony Pratkanis, which can be used as focal point for a social 
influence campaign. 
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in current and future COIN operations with baseline knowledge to help determine which 
social influence COGs and tactics will be most useful to their specific operation. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a brief history and description of the 
science of social influence.  It discusses the main sources, theories, and theorists that will 
be used to conduct a social influence analysis of the CAP.  Chapter II continues with a 
brief overview of the sources used for research on the CAP. 
Chapter III, Methodology, is a short chapter on how the research for this thesis 
was conducted and how it will be applied to answer the thesis questions.   
Chapter IV, The Combined Action Program is a history of the CAP and includes 
indicators of success. 
Chapter V, Centers of Gravity Analysis, introduces each center of gravity that 
applies to social influence and provides examples of how the CAP or the VC exploited 
them. 
Chapter VI, Social Influence Tactics used in South Vietnam, provides additional 
social influence tactics used with examples. 
Chapter VI provides a conclusion for the research study, and includes a 
preliminary tool to be used to determine which tactics can be used in specific COIN 
situations.  Additionally there are suggestions for applying some of the lessons learned in 
the future, and areas that warrant further analysis or research.       
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
Sociology, the study of society, can be traced back to the time of Plato (428–327 
BC).  Sociology looks at human social activity and attempts to apply research and 
knowledge to better social welfare.  Some of the most notable sociologists since the 16th 
century are Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Karl Marx (1818–1883), and most recently 
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).8   
Psychology, the study of mind and behavior, can also be traced back to ancient 
civilizations.  The first mention of the word in English was in 1693 in Steven Blankaart’s 
The Physical Dictionary.  In it he states, “Anthropoligia is the study of man or the 
doctrine concerning him, which is divided into two parts—Anatomy, which treats the 
body and Psychology, which treats the soul.”9  Today the names Freud, Jung, and 
Maslow are all synonymous with psychology.  Modern psychology examines both the 
mind and behavior, with a focus on cognition or mental processes.  It should be noted that 
the discipline of social psychology (wherein social influence lies) is a sub discipline of 
psychology.10   
Social psychology combines theories and empirical evidence from both sociology 
and psychology, then applies scientific methods and facts to study social phenomena.  
The science of social influence has been studied since the late nineteenth century.  Much 
has been written on social influence and how it can be used to shape an individual’s 
behavior, feelings and actions.  Gordon Willard Allport, a prominent leader in studies on 
rumor (social influence tactic) defines social psychology as “a discipline that uses  
 
 
                                                 
8 Allan G. Johnson, The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology: A User's Guide to Sociological Language, 
2nd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 363–368. 
9 Andrew M. Colman, A Dictionary of Psychology, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 
619. 
10 Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey,  The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th 
ed. (Oxford University Press, USA, 1998), 4. 
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scientific methods to understand and explain how the thought, feeling and behavior of 
individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of other human 
beings.”11   
A contemporary of Allport, Kurt Lewin is regarded as one of the founders of 
social psychology.  He changed forever the understanding of experimental learning, 
leadership, action research, and group dynamics.  Lewin empirically showed how human 
behavior is a product of one’s internal makeup and is affected by the environment in 
which the individual lives.12  His field theory is focused on the power of the situation.  
He defines a field as the totality of coexisting facts that are conceived of as mutually 
interdependent.  In order to understand one’s behavior (to understand is a precursor to 
influencing), his or her entire lifespace and surrounding environment must be taken into 
consideration.13  Lewin’s work provided a foundation for modern research on social 
influence and showed how social interactions can be measured and studied.14            
Both World Wars brought about exceptional research and advanced theories in 
the field of social influence.  During and after the Second World War much work was 
done by Hovland15, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet16, and many others who researched the 
influence of propaganda, rumor, innuendo, mass communications, and other tactics.  Yet, 
still, there not an abundance of literature directly associating specific military operations 
with the science of social influence.   
 Researchers have identified 107 individual social influence tactics.  Pratkanis 
reviews all 107 in The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress.  A 
social influence tactic is defined as “any noncoercive technique, device, procedure, or 
                                                 
11 Gilbert, Fiske, and Lindzey, The Handbook of Social Psychology, 3. 
12 Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers (Greenwood Pub Group, 
1975), 3. 
13 Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science, 240. 
14 Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress. 1st ed. 
(Psychology Press, 2007), 4. 
15 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 4. Hovland conducted experimental research on the 
effects of source credibility, individual differences, and organization of the message on persuasion. 
16 Ibid. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet found that voters were able to be swayed using mass media 
content.  
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manipulation capable of creating or changing the belief or behavior of a target of the 
influence attempt.”17  Many of these tactics along with a cognitive COG analysis will be 
used to contribute to the SIA. 
 The term “center of gravity” was developed by Prussian military mastermind Carl 
von Clausewitz.  A COG is described as a source of strength for any military or 
government involved in a conflict.  He defines a COG as “the hub of all power and 
movement, on which everything depends.”18  The idea is that the COG must be the focal 
point of all actions against an adversary in order to make the greatest impact and increase 
the chance for victory.  It is rare for an adversary to have only one COG, so it is 
necessary to be able to determine what the COGs are and how best to attack or exploit 
them.   
Just as Clausewitz theorized that COGs should be used against adversaries in 
traditional warfare, Pratkanis suggests there are certain focal points that should also be 
used to develop an influence campaign.  In Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts, 
he identifies nine COGs, which he says should be the focus of one’s social influence 
campaign during public diplomacy in international conflict.  Although they should not be 
confused with Clauswitz’s wartime COGs, which are only used in this thesis as a 
reference,19 there is a relationship between the two.  They both help determine where 
military leaders should focus their attention.  Clauswitz’s COGs addresses the physical, 
Pratkanis’s COGs address the cognitive.  Pratkanis created his COGs using concepts of 
social influence.  They are not just principles of social influence, rather focal points 
where one should bring all of their social influence effort to bear on the adversary.20  
They are: 1) Primacy of Strategic Attack 2) Morale Beneffectance 3) Trust 4) Agenda 
Setting 5) Attitudinal Selectivity 6) Self-Justification 7) Seeds of Hatred 8) Psychological  
 
                                                 
17 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 4. 
18 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (bnpublishing.com, 2007, 595–596. 
19 Note: Clauswitz’s COGs apply to traditional warfare; Pratkanis’ apply to social influence 
campaigns. 
20 Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts:  A Social Influence Analysis,” 123. 
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Reactance 9) The Fog of Propaganda.21  These nine COGs can be used to determine 
which social influence tactics should be used, when they should be applied, and to which 
target they should be directed.   
Influence is not just communicating policy to be heard, but, “changing public 
opinion, beliefs, behavior, expectations, perspectives, and the like in support of U.S. 
foreign policy.”22  An important characteristic of influence is that it is not simply telling 
the target what you want them to hear or how you want them to act; if this were the case, 
every attempt at influence conducted by U.S. in Vietnam would have been a success.  
Instead, influence is a complex manipulation of perception that is used to set up a 
situation in a way that the target decides how they will act in accordance with how they 
perceive the situation.   
Pratkanis divides influence tactics into categories using the four main tasks of a 
communicator according to classical rhetoric theory.  They are: 1) landscaping or pre-
persuasion, 2) source credibility, 3) effective message tactics, and, 4) emotional tactics.23  
These categories make it easier to identify the correct tactic for a specific situation or 
goal.     
A landscaping tactic is one that “structures the situation in such a way that the 
target is likely to be receptive to a given course of action and respond in a desired 
manner.”24  Source credibility tactics rely on relationships that must be established 
between the source and the target of influence.25  Effective message tactics are those that 
organize, provide and induce the target to come up with their own arguments and reasons 
for a given course of action.26  The final category, emotional tactics, achieves influence 
by exploiting the target’s feelings, affect, arousal, emotions and tensions states.27  One of 
the first landscaping tactics examined in this thesis is Set Expectations.   
                                                 
21 Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts:  A Social Influence Analysis,” 125. 
22 Ibid., 134. 
23 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 19. 
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 Ibid., 30. 
26 Ibid., 40. 
27 Ibid., 50. 
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Setting expectations is a landscaping tactic that can sculpt the setting by creating a 
reference point, by which options are judged, and by guiding interpretations and 
perceptions that create a picture of reality. Pratkanis conducted experiments in which 
subliminal self-help tapes were played to subjects that were supposed to improve memory 
or build self-esteem.  Some of the tapes were purposely mislabeled, causing a subject 
who thought he or she was listening to a memory improvement tape to actually be 
listening to a self-esteem tape.  Results showed perceived improvement by the subjects 
simply based on the labels on the tapes.  The expectations of the subjects created a reality 
that did not exist.28  Prior to most of the following tactics, a set of expectations must be 
perceived by the target.  A belief or vision of the future, created by setting expectations, 
is what will guide follow on influence tactics.      
 Other popular landscaping tactics are Control the Flow of Information, Innuendo, 
and Projection.  Controlling the flow of information is the selective presentation of 
information in order to affect decision making to ones advantage.  This is an important 
aspect of any military operation; it especially pertains to counterinsurgency operations.  
When two sides are competing to win over the population, the one that best controls the 
flow of information will have the advantage.  Controlling the flow of information can be 
accomplished by limiting channels through which the population receives information, 
propaganda, censorship, and selected leaks and plants of information.  Controlling the 
flow of information is not new in any respect and has been studied and practiced for 
years.  In 1934, experiments by Annis and Meier helped them conclude that the planting 
of biased political information in college newspapers affected the decisions of the 
targets.29  Command chronologies from 1st Command Action Group (CAG) indicate that 
controlling the flow of information was a top priority of the CAP.  Tactics included 
taking complete control of entire radio bands, so only the U.S. could broadcast,30 erasing  
 
 
                                                 
28 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 23.  
29 Ibid., 26. 
30 “1st Combined Action Group Command Chronology for the period 1 May 1969–31 May 1969,” 
June 20, 1969. 
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Viet Cong (VC) slogans and other evidence of VC influence, and placing televisions and 
radios in strategic Vietnamese households in order to make pro-Government of Vietnam 
(GVN) more available.31 
 Innuendo is an insinuation of a fact concerning the reputation and character of a 
subject, normally in a hurtful or derogatory nature.32  One effective way of employing 
this tactic is simply by asking questions that create doubt as to one’s character.  Wegner, 
Wenzlaff, Kerker, and Beattie conducted experiments on subjects during the time of 
national elections.  The tests were run on a group of people who were presented with 
articles regarding political candidates.  Headlines were in the form of questions, 
assertions, and denials pertaining to the character of different candidates.  The study 
revealed that questioning yielded a level of distrust equal to assertions and higher than the 
denial headlines presented.33  
A more specific form of innuendo is projection.  Projection takes innuendo one 
step further.  Instead of suggesting (through whichever way as mentioned above) 
derogatory information about a subject, projection accuses that subject of the negative 
traits possessed by the influence agent.  By doing so, the influence agent hopes to deflect 
attention from ones own misdeeds.  Rucker and Pratkanis showed through experiments 
that this tactic is extremely effective even after targets have tried to refute the claim.34   
Additional landscaping tactics that are applicable to counterinsurgency operations 
and discussed in this thesis are: agenda setting, coalition formation, jigsawing, and fait 
accompli (creating a psychology of the inevitable). 
The source credibility tactic, or a tactic that relies on a social relationship, 
discussed in this thesis is the altercast.  There are many forms of altercasting that include 
the tact altercast, authority—agent altercast, expert—unknowing public, high status—
admirer altercast, physically attractive—admirer altercast, and many others.  The 
                                                 
31 “1st Combined Action Group Command Chronology for the period 1 Nov 1968–30 Nov 1968,” 
January 10, 1969. 
32 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 27. 
33 D. M. Wegner, R. Wenzlaff, R. M. Kerker, and A. E. Beattie, “Incrimination Through Innuendo:  
Can media question become public answers?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1981): 
825. 
34 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 27. 
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common theme among all of these altercasts is that they place targets in a specific social 
role with the goal of that target behaving socially in accordance with that role.35  In his 
work Altercasting as an Influence Tactic, Pratkanis describes many of the tactics and 
identified three social pressures that are brought about when a person accepts a role 
through altercasting, they are: 
1) Others in the social environment expect the altar to behave in a manner 
consistent with the role. 
2) The role provides the altar with selective exposure to information consistent 
with the role. 
3) The role is associated with a social identity that provides the altar with a stake 
in a given social system.36 
The close living conditions and daily interactions with the population experienced 
by CAP Marines created an ideal environment for emotional tactics.  Emotional tactics 
include fear appeals, norm of reciprocity, commitment traps, effort justification, empathy, 
and psychological reactance.  In their thesis Integrating Social Influence Tactics Into 
Contemporary Military Operations, Scott Cone, William Rayfield, and Joseph Stach 
address all of these and provide recommendations for their use, reasons why they work, 
success factors, risks, and counter tactics.   
Their thesis is the first of its kind, in that it takes several recognized social 
influence tactics and applies them to military operations.  This thesis builds on their work 
and applies many of the COGs and tactics discussed above to a specific military program, 
the CAP.   
B. COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM (CAP) 
The CAP was a pacification program used by the U.S. Marines in South Vietnam.  
Its strategy in Vietnam differed from that of the top commander, General Westmoreland, 
                                                 
35 Anthony R. Pratkanis, “Altercasting as an influence tactic.” In Attitudes, Behavior, and Social 
Context: The Role of Norms and Group Membership, 201–226. (Psychology Press, 1999), 202. 
36 Ibid., 203–204. 
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which was attrition through a “search and destroy” strategy.37  The CAP concept 
combines a squad of Marines and a platoon of South Vietnamese Popular Forces to assist 
villages in resisting VC influence.  By living within the villages, CAP Marines were able 
to cut off the VC and NVA from their most important resource, the people.  A more 
detailed discussion of the CAP is provided in Chapter IV.  The following is a review of 
sources used for both the history/overview and for the SIA conducted in Chapters V and 
VI.  
The official history of the Marine Corps, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, is a five 
volume series that contains detailed summaries of the yearly operations of the Marines in 
Vietnam.  They were prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division and 
cover year by year the Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War.  The co-author of 
this series is Mr. Jack Shulimson, the senior civilian historian on the Vietnam project at 
the time.38  The series only lightly discusses the CAP, but does provide the names of the 
CAP commands and high ranking officers, which makes for a great starting point for any 
military research.        
The Betrayal is a critique of U.S. actions in Vietnam by one of the CAP 
commanders, Lt. Col. William R. Corson.  Much of the book is focused on what was 
wrong with the war, especially the attitude of the top commanders and politicians about 
how the war should be approached.  Two chapters are devoted to addressing the actions 
of the CAPs and provide detail and some insight how they were run and how the 
Vietnamese felt about U.S. troops living and operating inside their villages.39  Corson 
wrote these books during the war so the years covered are limited (1965–1967); however, 
it provides an excellent foundation for understanding the CAP in the context of the 
overall U.S. mission in Vietnam.   
                                                 
37 Edward F. Murphy, Semper Fi: Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ: Marine Corps Campaigns, 
1965–1972 (Presidio Press, 1997), 37.  
38 Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam.  Information was also collected from the 1966 and 1969 
versions of the same series.   
39 William R. Corson, The Betrayal. (W. W. Norton, 1968). 
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The next major source used for researching the CAP was “The Combined Action 
Program:  An Alternative Not Taken,” a master’s honors thesis by Robert Klyman at the 
University of Michigan.  It is a broad overview of the CAP that attempts to answer the 
questions: “1) What exactly was the CAP, and how did it develop from 1965–1971? 2) 
What did the commanders of the Marines and the CAP think of the program?  3) Did they 
think it was a success?”40  The strength of this thesis lies in its bibliography. Klyman 
conducted in-depth research of the chronologies, oral histories, and other records kept at 
the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington, D.C., and those sources were valuable 
to research for this thesis.       
Although Klyman’s research does not cover any civic action or community 
development projects that could provide some insight into particular social influence 
tactics, Michael Peterson’s “The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ Other 
War in Vietnam” does.  This book provides an historical overview of the CAP and an 
analysis of civic action and community development projects conducted.  It provides 
details of projects conducted inside the villages, figures on handouts,41 and most 
importantly, the local perception of these projects.42  Albert Hemingway’s Our War Was 
Different is another book that focuses solely on the CAP.  It is an “intimate look at life in 
the villages, as experienced by CAP members from different platoons throughout the I 
Corps section of Vietnam.”43  Both Peterson’s and Hemingway’s works were a key to 
collecting the data for the SIA.   
The Village provides one of the only long-term accounts of any of the CAPs.  It is 
a firsthand account of a platoon in the Chu Lai area from 1967–1971.44  Its focus is on 
                                                 
40 Robert Klyman, “The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken” (master’s thesis., 
University of Michigan, 1986), 5.  
41 Michael E. Peterson, The combined action platoons: the U.S. Marines' other war in Vietnam 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 1989), 24.  
42 Peterson, The combined action platoons, 104–114. 
43 Albert Hemingway, Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam (Naval 
Institute Press, 1994), xiii.  
44 F. J. West, The Village: The True Story of 17 Months in the Life of Vietnamese Village, Where a 
Handful of American Volunteers and Vietnamese Militia Lived and Died Together Trying to Defend It, 1st 
ed. (Harper & Row, 1972). 
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one platoon inside the hamlet Binh Nghia, so there is not much mention of the program 
as a whole, rather a day-to-day account of the lives of the Marines who lived in the 
village. 
Other sources of information used for data collection on the CAP were articles 
from the Marine Corps Gazette, command chronologies, and recorded interviews of CAP 
Marines obtained from the Marine Corps Archives in Quantico, Virginia.  These sources 
proved to be the most useful in getting a direct from the source critique of the program.  
The command chronologies list facts, figures, and daily events of each of the CAPs under 
their command.  The interviews come straight from the source with Marines who were 
serving or had just served in a combined action platoon.  The questions range from “what 
was your mission” to “what did you personally think of the villagers” to “what types of 
problems did you have with the PFs assigned to you.”  No literature or written articles 
provide as much detail about the CAP 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis presents opinions and factual information derived from multiple 
sources.  The goal of the research was to gather enough information on the CAP in 
Vietnam so that it could be analyzed with specific tactics pulled from the science of 
social influence, then determine under which conditions the tactics worked, when they 
did not work, and why.  Understanding when and how to apply the right social influence 
tactics to specific military operations (e.g., counterinsurgency) will aid military planners 
when creating an influence plan.  In depth research was conducted on the two topics and 
then analysis was performed attempting to tie the two together. 
First, the CAP is outlined and the history and development of the its use in South 
Vietnam is described.  It is important to examine the history of the program in order to 
fully understand the purpose and mission behind its use and implementation before it can 
be analyzed through the lens of the science of social influence. This is done through 
extensive surveying of primary sources like FMFPAC command chronologies and taped 
interviews, as well as secondary sources like those mentioned above in the literature 
review. 
The command chronologies for I CAG and 2d CAG were used to build a 
chronological narrative of the program’s development.  Details on numbers of troops, 
amounts of handouts, specific community projects, and daily events were all obtained 
from these reports.  Using the knowledge of social influence obtained from research, the 
chronologies were reviewed looking for indicators of social influence in action.  
Particular attention was paid to the numbers of villages pacified, PSYOP/propaganda 
summaries, and summaries of daily interaction with the villagers.     
The taped interviews come from veterans from the CAP, and include the views of 
both officers and enlisted Marines. Additionally, the interview subjects spanned all levels 
of military analysis from small unit leadership at the tactical level to operational and 
strategic leadership at the battalion level.  Each interview was listened to with the intent  
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of determining what, if any, social influence tactics the Marines were using.  The same 
type of indicators mentioned in the command chronology section above, were pulled out 
from the recordings for analysis.     
The second area of research focused on the Science of Social Influence.  This 
thesis uses specific COGs and influence tactics along with the CAP data to conduct an 
SIA of the CAP.  The following guidelines for conducting a formal SIA were used: 
a) the social influence, power, and deceptive tactics typically used in a given 
domain;  
b) the centers of gravity or the factors that will determine the success or failure of 
influence in a domain;  
c) how influence is exchanged within a community (social institutions and 
influence landscape).45  
The specific COGs and influence tactics used for evaluation have been extensively 
researched, and were recommended as analysis factors by Pratkanis.  
 A COG, which is a focal point for conducting a social influence campaign, is 
made up of corollaries that break it down into smaller subsets of requirements.  The 
corollaries are dependent on specific social influence tactics, which are also further 
analyzed.  Each applicable COG and its associated corollaries, and tactics, is used to 
examine the data acquired from the research conducted on the CAP.  Specific examples 
of the CAPs using the techniques described by the COGs are provided in each section.  
This information was then put into a reference table (Table 1), that identifies which 
specific tactics should be considered during specific conditions that may be encountered 




                                                 
45 Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts:  A Social Influence Analysis,” 119. 
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IV. THE COMBINED ACTION PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1954, Vietnam had been divided along the 17th parallel with a communist 
government in the North and anti communists in the South.  The U.S. had a presence in 
South Vietnam since around 1950 providing advisory assistance in an effort to prevent a 
communism from taking over the entire country.  In early January 1965, hostilities and 
political unrest were building in South Vietnam.  Up to that point there were few U.S. 
combat troops in Vietnam.  The U.S. presence consisted mostly of technicians, advisors, 
pilots, supply and administrative personnel.46  In February, the commander of Military 
Assistance Command (MACV), General William C. Westmoreland, determined that two 
Marine battalions were needed for security of one of South Vietnam’s most important 
airbases in Da Nang.47  On March 8, 1965, the Marines arrived on the beaches of Da 
Nang welcomed by university students and girls holding leis of flowers, a gesture set up 
by the mayor of Da Nang.48  By the end of 1965, 38,000 additional Marines were 
deployed to South Vietnam as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF).  They were 
commanded by Major General Lewis W. Walt, who fell under the command of MACV, 
General Westmoreland.49 
Westmoreland, an Army General, believed in a strategy of attrition.  He favored 
“big battalion” approach to fighting the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet 
Cong (VC).50  “Search and destroy” would become his fighting call to both his troops 
and top politicians.  During search and destroy, he stated, that the villagers had three 
choices: 
1)  Stay close to his land (risk living in a free fire zone) 
                                                 
46 Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, xi. 
47 Ibid., 9.  
48 Ibid., 12. 
49 Ibid., xi. 
50 David A. Clement, “LE MY Study In Counterinsurgency,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1967, 22.  
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2)  Join VC (become a target in a free fire zone) 
3) Move to an area under the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) control 
(become a refugee)51.   
The Marines had a different view of what it would take to win the war.  The Small 
Wars Manual published in 1940 contains the statement: “In small wars, tolerance, 
sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the 
population….The purpose should always be to restore normal government….and to 
establish peace, order, and security….”52  General Walt believed in pacification and was 
a supporter of tactics described in the Small Wars Manual.53  
In early May 1965, two companies of Marines, along with a platoon of 
Vietnamese Popular Forces (PFs), drove off guerrilla forces in the village of Le My, eight 
miles south of Da Nang.  The Marines stayed, built a defensive perimeter, and for the 
first time in years the village was not under the influence of the VC.  In Le My, the 
Marine’s strategy emphasized self-help projects that helped build a school, dispensary, 
marketplace, and two bridges.  Later that month, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) 
commander Lieutenant General (LTGen) Victor H. Krulak and Lieutenant Colonel 
(LTCol) David A. Clement met with the chiefs of Le My.  During that meeting, the 
village chiefs had one question, “Are you going to stay?”54  That one question prompted 
LTGen Krulak to further implement pacification tactics with the goal of winning the 
support of the South Vietnam population.  He stated to Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, 
Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC),  
It is our conviction that if we can destroy the guerrilla fabric among the 
people, we will automatically deny the larger units the food and the 
                                                 
51 Raymond C. Damm, “The combined action program: A tool for the future, ” Marine Corps Gazette, 
October 1998, 2. 
52 “U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual.” Washington: GPO, 1940, I-32. 
53 Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam (Funk & Wagnalls 
Co, 1970), 29.  
54 Clement, “LE MY Study In Counterinsurgency,” 3. 
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intelligence and the taxes and the other support they need.  The real war is 
among the people and not among the mountains.55 
B. THE CAP CONCEPT 
One of the most successful of the pacification programs implemented in Vietnam 
was the CAP.  The CAP concept combined a squad of Marines and a platoon of South 
Vietnamese Popular Forces (PFs) to assist villages in resisting VC influence.   Figure 1 
depicts the organization of these platoons.  It shows that the Marines and the PFs were 
completely integrated within the unit.  This means that Marine fire-team leaders would be 
platoon squad leaders and Marine riflemen would be platoon fire-team leaders.  The 
Marines trained the PFs to become a viable fighting force and contributed any necessary 
air and artillery support during battles.  The PFs provided local knowledge (e.g., terrain, 
customs) and intelligence.  By combining forces and living inside the villages, the 
Marines believed they could win the “hearts and minds” of the villagers and gain 
intelligence on the movement of VC in return for security (see Figure 2 for a Combined 
Action Platoon (CAPs) Mission).  In the summer of 1965, the CAP took hold and four 
CAPs were formed into a Combined Action Company (CAC). 
                                                 
55 Edward Doyle, Samuel Lipsman, America Takes Over the Vietnam Experience (Time Life UK, 
1985), 61–65.  
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Figure 1.   Organization of a Combined Action Platoon (From Corson, 1968)56  
The CAP concept was not new to the Marines; in fact very similar strategies were 
used during the Banana Wars (Haiti 1915–1934, Nicaragua 1926–1933, and Santo 
Domingo 1916–1923).  During those wars, U.S. Marines organized, trained, and directed 
local forces, which became the national police force or Polica Nacional.  After intense 
training with the Marines, the Polica Nacional would go out on anti-guerrilla patrols 
while the Marines stayed in the villages and conducted security.  This tactic proved  
                                                 
56 Corson, The Betrayal, 182. 
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successful, frustrating Rebel Leader Augusto Cesar Sandino to the point that he put 
bounties on some of the Marines—dead or alive.57  The same would be true for many of 
the CAP Marines in Vietnam.   
 
Figure 2.   2d Combined Action Group Mission for Combined Action Platoons (From 2d 
CAG Chronology)58 
C. GROWTH AND SUCCESS 
After the initial establishment of the CAP, the program quickly expanded.  By the 
end of 1966, there were 57 CAPs consisting of 729 enlisted Marines and 1482 
Vietnamese PFs.  In 1970, at its peak size and strength there were 42 Marine officers,  
 
 
                                                 
57 Hemingway, Our War Was Different, 3.  
58 “2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology for the period of 1 Oct 1968–30 Nov 1968,” 
January 9, 1968, 14. 
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2050 enlisted Marines, two naval officers, 126 Navy corpsmen and nearly 3000 PFs 
operating 114 CAPs.59  2d CAG in Quang Nam Province was the largest and 4th CAG in 
Quang Tri Province was the smallest.     
One of the few quantitative indicators of success (measure of effectiveness 
(MOE)) was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).  The HES was created in 1966 under 
the direction of the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara.  The HES tracked and 
analyzed information on all aspects of pacification.  The information used for evaluation 
was provided by province and district advisors and included security, political, and socio-
economic information.  It assigned hamlets a letter grade A-E or V.  A meaning the 
hamlet has adequate security forces, B—a VC threat exists, C—Hamlet is subject to 
infrequent VC harassment, D—VC activity including taxation and terrorism exist, E—
The VC are effective, V—Hamlet under VC control.60  Hamlets rated A, B, or C were 
considered pacified for the time, and those with a D, E, or V were given the most 
attention.  Most CAPs noted an improvement in the HES when it was used for evaluation.  
“For example, 24 of the 39 villages with CACs in place, including nine that had been 
initiated within three months of the study, saw an improvement in their HES score.61   
The problem with the HES, as many CAP leaders have noted, is that it could not 
capture the essence of pacification.  That is, whether or not a villager felt safe at home.  
“One Marine general noted, “there are various indices by which a hamlet is judged 
‘secured’ or ‘pacified’: one of the most pragmatic and useful is whether or not the chief 
sleeps in his hamlet at night”.”62       
Other quantitative indicators of success include patrols, kill ratios,63 numbers of 
deserters,64 and construction projects.65  Patrols were a solid indicator of the success of 
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the CAP.  In 1970, the CAPs were conducting almost 1000 patrols each month, with the 
majority of them at night because that was the time when the VC was most active.  In the 
first half of 1970 the CAPs killed nearly 500 VC forces and captured over 80 prisoners 
while only losing 22 men of their own.66  These numbers (especially those of Marine 
casualties) were much lower than those of the units conducting “search and destroy” 
missions.   
The most noteworthy success of the CAP can be found in qualitative data such as 
what the CAP leaders, villagers, and the VC thought of the program.  These data will 
serve the purpose of this thesis because influence (in an influence campaign) is based 
largely on what is believed, or perceived, by those involved.       
In his debrief on May 2, 1969, COL George Knapp, after serving as Chief of 
Plans and Policy Branch of I CORP Joint Staff, stated: 
I believe the CAP program is one of our greatest contributors that we have 
in I CORPS as does the civilians out there also, and I might add that the 
Army officers in I Corps that come in contact with it are completely sold 
on it and I cannot understand why the Army and other Corps areas will not 
adopt a similar program.67 
For the most part, CAP Marines were just as enthusiastic.  “I feel that this type of 
program is going to win this conflict in Vietnam.  Maybe not now or in the next five 
years or even the next ten years.  But the children who we are helping now are going to 
remember who helped them.”68  The belief in the program can be seen in the fact that 
some put their personal time and money into the effort.  “I provided my own money to 
one of the kids in the village who sold popsicles everyday instead of going to school.  So 
I gave him money to buys clothes and go to school. So that he might learn something and 
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not grow up to be a VC.  After that I also sent another girl to school.”69  The fact that the 
Marines directly involved in the program believed in it provides evidence that there was 
enough buy-in (amongst its practicers), and dedication devoted to the effort to achieve 
success.  
The villager’s belief in the CAP can be found through various reports as well.  
One of their greatest contributions and proof of an ability to succeed is the fact that once 
the villagers trusted the Marines they began to provide significant intelligence as to the 
whereabouts and activities of the VC, and interact with them socially.  FMFPAC reports 
state: 
“CAPs in Quang Nam Province continue to be the best source of accurate, timely 
information because of their extremely close relationship in working and living with the 
people.”70 
Then, seven months later: 
“The close contact of the CAPs with the village population continues to be the 
nerve center of the intelligence chain.”71 
Marines were often invited to social functions by the villagers.  Normally 
reserved for only the closest of family and friends; CAP Marines oftentimes found 
themselves taking part in banquets, weddings, and funerals. 
Another indication of success or the perceived ability of success comes from the 
actions of the VC in regards to the CAP.  Many CAP Marines had a price put on their 
heads by the VC.  One of them, SGT Calvin Brown, was known by the Vietnamese for 




                                                 
69 CPL Joseph A. Trainor, No. 2202-2341-3c, Oral History Collection, History and Museum 
Collection, HQMC. 
70 “2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology for the period of 1 OCT 1968 - 30 NOV 
1968,” 10. 
71 “2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology for the period 1 May 1969–31 May 1969.” 
 25
Marine, SGT Melvin Murrell, had a bounty put on him by the VC of 750,000 Piasters, 
dead or alive.72  For the VC to place bounties on U.S. Marines, they must have felt 
threatened by the CAP.  
To fully understand what the CAP was doing to accomplish the above successes, 
an exploration of how cognitive COGs and individual influence tactics play into a social 
influence campaign is required.  The remaining chapters look at the successes of the CAP 
through the lens of the science of social influence.   
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V. CENTERS OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will use several of the COGs developed by Anthony Pratkanis for 
campaigns in international conflict to analyze tactics used by both the CAP and the Viet 
Cong (VC) in South Vietnam.73  Each applicable COG and its associated corollaries will 
be applied to operations conducted by the CAP in an attempt to provide military leaders 
today with a baseline in which to focus their efforts when conducting an influence 
campaign in COIN operations.   
1. COG 1:  Primacy of Strategic Attack 
Social influence campaigns should be thought of in terms of a strategy of goals, 
targets, and means and operations.  Goals are those actions, beliefs, and attitudes that are 
to be affected.  The targets are those whom the campaign will be focused on.  The means 
and operations are the social influence tactics that will be used.74  The key to victory is 
attacking your opponent’s strategy while at the same time protecting your own.    
During the Vietnam War, both the CAP and VC conducted social influence 
campaigns using the above mentioned strategy.  The VC’s stated mission was the 
reunification of Vietnam, to be accomplished by the overthrow of the U.S. backed 
government in South Vietnam.  Its strategy was to convince the population that they 
could liberate Vietnam from the colonial imperialism first represented by the French then 
the Americans.  The message was that if the imperialists were removed, Vietnam could 
once again be ruled by the Vietnamese.75  The U.S. strategy was to protect South 
Vietnam from communism, and at the same time stop the fall of another government to 
the communists.  The goals of each were conflicting, the means and operations different, 
but the target was the same—the South Vietnamese population.     
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A tactic used by the VC was to hide in the villages during the day, and conduct 
ambushes against U.S. and GVN troops at night.  As long as the villages were under their 
control (or influence), they always had a place to eat, sleep, resupply, and most 
importantly spread their propaganda and recruit.76 
a. Strategic Traps 
“An effective influence campaign is one that traps and constrains enemy 
action and weakens and divides support for the adversary; conversely, an ineffective 
influence campaign is one that can serve as a trap for one’s own cause.”77 
The VC held an advantage in that the only strategic traps that would affect 
them would have to be self inflicted.  It needed to ensure that the Vietnamese were ruling 
the country, and that they(VC) did not do anything to strengthen the fear of communism.  
The trap to avoid for the U.S. was being seen as another imperialist in control of Vietnam 
through an appointed and therefore, puppet government.     
For the U.S. to be successful it was necessary to counter the “imperialist 
liberator” theme by creating a nasty image of the VC and communism.  Because of its 
mission, the CAP was an effective tool to accomplish this.  The initial CAP mission 
statement included: destroying VC infrastructure, protect assigned villages and friendly 
infrastructure, and participate in civic action and conduct Psychological Operations 
(PSYOP) as part of a local effort toward “Nation Building.”78 The CAP was effective in 
keeping the VC from promoting their strategy in the villages they occupied because they 
were set up in a way that denied the VC refuge (living in the villages and providing 
twenty-four hour security).   
A component of the CAP strategy that contributed to dividing support for 
the VC was empowering the people.  Building new buildings, schools, and wells was a 
popular tactic conducted by U.S. troops throughout the South Vietnam countryside.  The 
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problem was that as soon as VC heard that a new structure had been put up, they would 
destroy it.  Before the CAP, the villagers were not affected by the VC destroying these 
new structures, since they had nothing invested in them.  In their minds, they were simply 
the projects of foreign entities trying to gain influence in the region.  The CAP Marines 
changed this with their approach of providing the villagers with the materials, giving 
direction and having the people build them.  Naturally, the villagers would feel a sense of 
pride and ownership and would then turn on the VC if they came in and destroyed the 
structures.79  The burning and destroying of structures that the villagers had a stake in by 
the VC was actually helping the CAP with a strategic trap.  Empowering the Vietnamese 
enabled the CAPs to directly attack the VC’s propaganda strategy of “America as the 
colonial imperialist,” by demonstrating that the U.S. was about promoting self-
determination and local rule.  
2. COG 2:  Morale Beneffectance 
“The battlefield in a social influence campaign is the morale of combatants, 
civilians of belligerents, neutrals and third parties who may become engaged in the 
conflict.”80 
Morale is the desire and willingness to start and then continue a cause or action.  
It is a function of the perceived legitimacy and goodness of the cause or action 
(beneficence or doing good) and the expectations of success.81  Morale beneffectance 
plays a huge role in COIN operations because during an insurgency, a goal of both the 
insurgents and counter insurgents is to persuade the general population that they are 
going to win, or, the victory of “our” side is inevitable.  When conducting COIN, this real 
or perceived expectation of success can be even more important than the “doing good” 
aspect of morale.  In most cases, the general population will support whichever group 
they believe is going to win.  This is because if, for example, a village does not support 
an insurgent group (with intelligence, food, shelter, etc.) and then that group is 
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successful, there is a justifiable fear of retribution.  This is the reason why it is so 
important to ensure the morale of the targets of an influence campaign is lifted and that of 
the enemy reduced.   
In Vietnam, the VC was constantly telling the villagers that “we are going to 
win.”  The only way for the CAPs to counter the VC and convince the villagers that they 
(U.S./GVN) were going to win, was through action.  This is where the “fait accompli” or 
psychology of the inevitable tactic is useful.  The “fait accompli” tactic is a process in 
which the target is convinced that a certain course of action is inevitable and there is 
nothing they can do about it.  It induces people to reconcile themselves to their fate, 
accept it, and even like it.82  An important aspect of this tactic is to convince the target 
that “we are not just going to win now, but also in the long run,” the target must believe 
that the assisting forces are not going to get up and go once things get rough.      
In many instances, the CAP Marines were able to convince the villagers that they 
were going to defeat the VC, and it therefore created a belief for the cause.  According to 
SGT Moore, a CAP Commander (1-3-4, Lima Company, Quong Ni Province), once 
regular daytime patrols of the rice paddies and nighttime ambushes of the VC (who were 
coming in to take the rice and seek shelter) commenced, the people believed in the CAPs 
and rewarded them with information on the VC.83  The ability for the villagers to harvest 
their rice in the daytime and keep it for themselves without harassment from the VC is an 
example of morale beneffectance in action.  The trust formed did not occur overnight, it 
took many months to cultivate.  Conducting both daytime and nighttime patrols on a 
regular basis, even after suffering casualties, demonstrated to the villagers that the CAPs 
felt that they could do what they wanted, and when they wanted to.       
                                                 
82 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 30. 




“The perceived success or failure of an action is determined, in part, by 
whether or not it succeeded or failed to meet expectations.”84 
An expectation is a belief about the future.  When two sides are creating 
expectations about the future, one must gain an advantage (“fait accompli” or psychology 
of the inevitable) in order to persuade the people that their side of the situation is the most 
appealing.  The influence agent should guide the targets interpretations and perceptions to 
create a picture of reality by setting expectations.85 
In order to win the “hearts and minds” of the people, the CAP had to first 
create believable expectations for them to hold on to.  The goal was to get the people to 
believe that the GVN was going to win, would best serve their personal interests, provide 
security, and that they no longer had to fear VC retribution.86  The issue was how.      
Traditionally, the Vietnamese villager’s most important social institution 
is the household, followed by the village.  The household and the village is where their 
personal interest lied.  Villages were in the form of a cooperative or protective 
association, which meant that farmers would keep some of their crops for their families, 
sell some, and turn over a portion of their crop to the village committees, which would 
store and redistribute the rice.  The VC knew this and took advantage of them by taxing 
individuals on their harvests, and taking the villagers crops to feed both themselves and 
the NVA.87  In order to set the expectation that the U.S./GVN were going to be victorious 
and the villagers could return to their ways of providing for themselves and contributing 
only to their families and their village, a PSYOP campaign was conducted.  It focused on 
convincing the ordinary rice farmer that he would benefit personally by GVN victory (see 
Figure 3 for an example).88 
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Figure 3.   Land Reform Leaflet (From Chandler, 1981)89     
The land to tiller program was one (not exclusively a CAP program) that 
aimed at taking away one of the Communist’s most successful appeals to the rural 
population, their land.  Giving the farmers their own land created a justifiable reason to 
support the GVN.90  It was important for the population to see that those in power 
believed in their own success.  The expectation of success was now being communicated 
by both the troops (through their relentless patrols mentioned in the above section), and 
the government.   
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3. COG 3:  Trust 
“Without trust and credibility a social influence campaign is impossible.”91 
Influence operations depend on trust and credibility because without them it 
would be impossible to guide a target audience in a desired direction.  One way to create 
trust and credibility is through the social influence tactic of altercasting.  There are many 
forms of altercasting, but essentially it is a tactic that places targets in a specific social 
role with the goal of that target behaving socially in accordance with that role.92 
Some pacification programs backfired on the U.S. because of the roles that they 
placed the villagers in.  The resettlement programs,93 for example, moved villagers into 
government controlled areas where they were provided with security in return for 
working the farms (not their own lands) in a co-operative fashion.  The problem with 
resettlement is that it historically creates resentment towards those who take people away 
from their homes.  To the GVN, these programs were a way of population control in an 
effort to keep them away from the VC and their propaganda machine.  To the villagers, 
they were a continuation of the pacification effort and colonial oppression that had been 
attempted in their country since the 1950s.  To the VC and NLF, they were concentration 
camps,94 which created an opportunity for exploiting them as such.   
The CAP, on the other hand, did not place the villagers in a foreign role.  Instead 
the villagers stayed in their homes, farmed their own land, and lived amongst their 
neighbors and families.  The CAP put them in the role of co-workers with the Marines 
and PFs, which differs greatly from being put in the role of worker of (or employee of, 
slave of) the U.S./GVN, which the resettlement programs did.  The CAP concept created 
an environment where trust between the villagers and the government came easier than in 
environments created by other pacification programs.   
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a. Listen 
“A trust relationship begins by listening to one’s audience.”95 
Listening makes it possible to both understand the thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, and concerns of the target and opens doors for continued communication.96  By 
simply listening to the villagers, CAP Marines were able to set up an atmosphere of trust 
where the villagers were encouraged to share their needs, fears, and opinions with them.  
The CAP concept really allowed this to happen, and happen fast because the CAPs were 
right there inside the villages where they were able to listen and respond to the villagers, 
sometimes immediately.   
An example of this tactic being implemented successfully comes from the 
village of Binh Nghia, a few miles north of My Lai.  There, the CAP assigned a district 
census grievance chief who would personally walk about the hamlets and ask villagers 
about their grievances against the Viet Cong and the government.97  Additionally, CAP 
Marines frequently held public meetings with the villagers where, in an open forum 
atmosphere; the villagers were able to voice their opinion.  Social influence theory 
suggests that by listening to the target, that target (due to the norm of reciprocity)98 
should then feel obligated to listen to the influence agent (CAP Marine).99  
b. The Significance of Deeds 
“Actions must in line with words.”100 
Trust and credibility depend on the idea that “seeing is believing.”  When 
attempting to influence a target, it is not enough to tell them what you are going to do or 
how you are going to help them, it must be proved to them through actions. 
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An example of actions backing words is described in this brief summary 
from a chapter in West’s The Village.  Ambushes from the VC were abundant in March 
1967.  Ten Marines and five PFs had been killed recently, and intelligence indicated that 
a huge patrol of VC (120 or so) were going to strike again.  Villagers left the village in 
fear of VC retribution.  The Marines and the PFs stayed behind and waited for the next 
ambush that was expected.  When it came, the Marines withstood the VC attack, and 
when the VC retreated, they ambushed them from the flanks inflicting numerous 
casualties.  The next day when the news spread, the villagers returned, surprised and 
exalted to see the Marines and PFs holding down the fort.101  “It was not for nothing.  In 
a sense, it was the most important battle the Americans at Fort Page ever prepared to 
fight.  They had chosen to stay; the PFs knew it, and soon so would the entire village.”102  
This act convinced both the villagers and the PFs that the Marines were going to stay, and 
they were not scared of the enemy.     
If the CAP Marines moved into a village and told the villagers that they 
were going to provide security, and then did not, or worse yet, left, legitimacy would be 
lost.  From that point on, little, if anything they say would be believed.  The CAP 
Marines, unlike many other pacification programs, stayed in the villages, secured them 
and therefore gained the trust of the villagers.  Moving into the villages was an attempt to 
prove to the villagers that the CAPs were not just a temporary fix (also addresses long 
term goal issue of COG 2).   
By March 1968, of the one hundred and eleven active CAPs, eighty-nine 
percent were not located within government compounds (like most Army and Marine 
Corps platoons); rather they lived directly in the villages.  By setting up permanent (or 
more stable) residences inside the villages, COL Danowitz, a CAP leader, states they 
accomplished three things: 
“1. Identified the platoon directly with the people, the people know that 
they are there to help and assist them 24 hours a day. 
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2. Assisted in the security of the platoon.  Daylight harbor site for the men, 
during the first hours of darkness the patrol and conduct ambushes.   
3. Created influence and effect between the PFs/Marines/villagers.  Shared 
meals with families.  Created a commonality, resentment discontinued.  Increased 
cooperation and mutual association.”103  
c. Propaganda and Trust 
“Emotional propaganda can produce short-term results but damage long-
term trust.”104 
Social influence that plays on the target’s emotions, whether or not it is 
based on facts, can be an effective way of influencing behavior.  However, when used 
over long periods of time, the chances are greater that the target will discover the 
manipulation and negatively affect the influence campaign,105 especially if it is based on 
deception.  
The CAP concept runs the same risk as any military group does when 
using deception, if it is discovered, credibility could come into question.  However, 
platoons in the CAP concept have the advantage of working directly with their targets 
(the Vietnamese).  By working with the village leaders the risk is minimized, because 
they can share the blame.  A villager may question the credibility of a campaign run 
solely by outsiders, but the village leader is one of them (villager) and the CAP Marine 
lives with them so the risk is lessened.   
4. COG 4:  Agenda Setting 
“Control of the topics of discussion impacts public opinion.”106 
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An agenda or a list of topics that are the focus of discussion must appear 
important and serve to define the criteria used in future discussions.  Studies have been 
conducted that show agenda setting can be done through various ways including the 
media.  In the case of the media, the issues that were given the most airtime were the 
issues the focus groups involved with the studies found to be the most important.107  
Another way setting the agenda can be accomplished is by persistently repeating the 
message or theme intended for the target.   
Controlling the flow of information is a way is to ensure your agenda gets the 
most airtime or visibility.  In international conflicts, dropping leaflets is a common form 
of setting the agenda through the control of information.  It can be a very productive 
tactic in rural areas, or those areas where the population does not receive daily news 
through the media.   
Command chronologies from multiple CAP commands show that leaders of the 
program understood the importance of ensuring persistent and repeated themes reached 
the target.  Take into consideration the following excerpts from 2d CAG: 
 
 
Figure 4.   PSYOP Activities May 1969 (From 2d CAG Chronology)108  
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Figure 5.   PSYOP Activities July 1970 (From 2d CAG Chronology)109 
These two excerpts come from the same command’s monthly reports, fourteen 
months apart.  This command was distributing the “CAPs are here to help you,” the “safe 
conduct passes,” and many other themes in bulk every month they were activated.  The 
volume of leaflets ensured that most, if not all, villagers were exposed to them as well as 
any VC in the area at the time of the drops.  The “safe conduct passes” can be viewed as 
the GVN setting the agenda by consistently informing both non-combatants (the 
villagers) and combatants (VC, NVA) that enemies of the GVN can defect and will be 
humanely treated with life and safety guaranteed (See Figures 6 and 7 for an example.) 
  
Figure 6.   Front of Safe Conduct Pass (From Chandler, 1981)110 
                                                 
109 “2d Combined Action Group Command Chronology for the period 1July 1970–30 Jul 1970.,” 3–
15. 
110 Chandler, War of ideas, 74. 
 39
 
Figure 7.   Reverse of Safe Conduct Pass (From Chandler, 1981)111 
Additionally, CAPs were able to control the agenda through constant informal 
communications with the villagers.  The CAP Marine lived in the village and established 
relationships with the people.  Through every day communication they were able to pick 
up on the villagers’ perspective of the Vietnamese agenda.  This agenda could then be 
made their own (the Marines) or modified if need be.   
5. COG 5:  Attitudinal Selectivity (Segmentation) 
“An individual uses an attitude selectively to make sense of the world and 
self.”112 
a. Segmentation 
“Groups of individuals with similar attitudes can be targeted with similar 
messages.”113 
Research did not reveal many specific segmentation attempts conducted 
by the CAP outside of separating the villagers from the VC.  However, one example that 
can be viewed of as segmentation and which comes very close to sounding like 
                                                 
111 Chandler, War of ideas, 74.  
112 Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts:  A Social Influence Analysis,” 132. 
113 Ibid. 
 40
resettlement (which as described previously, tends to create resentment) occurred in 
October 1968.  Platoon 1-3-5 “moved 556 families up from the lower level,” of a hillside 
in Chu Lai, “into our ville, and told them if they didn’t want any contact with VC we 
would protect them, the ones who stayed down there were considered VC 
sympathizers.”114  In this particular case, this form of segmentation worked to the CAPs 
advantage, possibly because the villagers were not moved too far from home.  It allowed 
for the platoon to ambush the VC when they came to get supplies or shelter from those 
who stayed behind since they had their location pinpointed, and for the CAP to focus 
specific messages towards specific segmented groups.115 
Although not clearly evident in CAP operations, segmentation was a 
factor within the population during the Vietnam War.  Some examples: 
a) In the south, upper class Catholics (minority) represented by Diem 
alienated the majority, Buddhists (many of whom were in his military),116 and lower 
class villagers (resettlement programs).117  This could be one cause of the villager’s 
reluctance to buy-in to the South Vietnamese effort. 
b) In the north, lower class support represented by Ho Chi Minh was 
made attractive to the lower classes in the south who felt neglected by the Diem 
regime.118 
In COIN operations, the following guidelines should be used to address 
segments within a region.  The first segment would be those who strongly or moderately 
agree with one’s side.  They should be targeted with messages that attempt to strengthen 
their commitment.  The second, neutrals, should be targeted with messages that try to 
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convince them to come to one’s side.  The final segment, enemies, can be targeted with 
messages aimed at convincing them to convert (in the previous example, this would be 
those who failed to move up the hill with the Platoon).  If that fails, a wedge approach 
called “chop and co-opt” may have to be used.  According to Pratkanis, “chop and co-
opt” is the removal of the leadership of an adversary from the situation and then the 
followers are co-opted to one’s own cause.119     
6. COG 6:  Self-Justification 
“The tension created by dissonance thoughts produces a drive to reduce that 
tension and may result in a rationalization trap.”120 
One of the most studied theories in Social Psychology is cognitive dissonance.  It 
is a theory that addresses how a person makes sense out of their environment and 
behavior, and then conducts their life a worthwhile manner.121  Essentially, it applies to 
the feelings one has when they have two conflicting ideas, and what they should do about 
them.  It is human nature to have a desire to reduce dissonance.  Several dissonance 
experiments show that if a person hurts another, then he or she must justify to themselves 
they did it.  The easiest way to justify it is to belittle the person they hurt, thereby self-
justifying the reasons for causing the hurt in the first place.  This can continue in a cycle 
that eventually leads to further aggression towards that person.122 
Self-justification includes the following implications for an influence campaign 
during international conflicts: 123  
a) The spreading of rumors and disinformation can serve to resolve dissonance.  
For example, a rumor campaign conducted by the political party (Buddhist struggle 
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movement) against police chief Lam attempted to discredit him amongst the villagers 
who were still on the fence in regards to support for the Saigon government.124   
b) Aggression often conflicts with a human’s view of him or herself and thus 
requires justification.  For example, to justify their assassinations or inadvertent killings, 
the VC would pin a note on the assassinated political leader detailing the crimes he 
committed, or in the case of an innocent villager being killed—within hours a rumor 
campaign would be started claiming the victim was a secret GVN agent.125 
c) A direct attack on belief, especially beliefs closely related to the self, can create 
defensiveness and thus strengthen the morale to fight.  For example, a major hurdle to 
overcome for outside forces who are working so closely the population is to not offend 
their customs.  LTCOL William Corson notes: 
The pettiest slights to a Vietnamese by an American could invite 
retribution.  If a Marine propositioned a married woman, or even crossed 
his leg at a dinner table, the insult could translate into a booby trap placed 
on some commonly patrolled trail, or a diagram of the CAP’s compound 
given over to the local VC cadre.126     
d) Discrepant and disagreeable information is often ignored or selectively 
interpreted.  The leaders in the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP), a member group of 
the NLF, were skilled at information dissemination and avoided public distribution of 
disagreeable messages.  For example, they knew that any mention of communism 
instantly turned some people off and in public only used “slogans and the Party 
declaration—but not the purposes—will be studied.”127  They carefully avoided any 
reference to communism.    
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7. COG 7:  Seeds of Hatred 
“Propaganda is most readily accepted by those who are under threat and relatively 
deprived.”128   
a. Perceived Injustice 
“The perception of an injustice is one of the strongest motivations for 
encouraging attacks including aggression and war.”129 
Warfare is based, or created, on the feeling of perceived injustice.  
Whether this perception is real, imagined, or manufactured, it must be addressed in a 
social influence campaign.130  In Vietnam, the villagers had a sense of injustice stemming 
from either the GVN itself, or on the other side of the spectrum, manufactured by the VC 
and the leaders in the north.   
The following are examples of how the CAP attempted to reduce any 
perceived injustice using the following guidelines provided by Pratkanis.   
a) Establish conflict resolution procedures that are perceived as legitimate 
and fair by all parties.131  CAPs spent much time working with the villagers and the 
village chiefs during the day.  Daily meetings were held between the CAP marines and 
the village chiefs where village chiefs would relay information and requests given to 
them by the villagers.132  By having a system set up where the locals could talk to their 
traditional leaders who would then pass the information to those with a direct path to the 
government, the villagers could feel that they had a voice. 
b) Reinforcement of principles of democracy including minority rights.133  
The PSYOP campaign conducted by the GVN (with U.S. guidance) pushed themes of 
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democracy to all targets.  Some leaflets included images of the population voting sending 
out the message that democracy was taking hold.  These leaflets also reached out to the 
VC and Communists in an effort to spark defection (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8.   Leaflet Promoting Democracy (From Chandler, 1981)134 
c) Provide other means to self worth than derogating a scapegoat.135  The 
CAP attempted this in many ways, including: teaching the villagers how to build and then 
supply them with the materials to build new buildings, introducing a Philippine “miracle 
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rice,” which doubled their crops, teaching the PFs how to be “real soldiers” who earned 
respect through their actions, and one interesting technique of teaching them a method of 
introducing fingerling fish to the rice paddies.  These fish would eat the mosquito larvae 
keeping the villagers and their animals more healthy, burrow in the mud to aerate the rice 
stalks, and then eventually grew into edible or sellable sized fish.136  These simple acts 
empowered the villagers and enabled them to make a difference in both their villages and 
their own personal financial situations.   
d) Separate demagogues from those who may be influenced by such 
appeals.  This was a goal of the CAP—separating the villagers in the south from the 
influence of the VC.  One problem often encountered with this strategy occurs as soon as 
the “occupying” or security providing forces leave, the demagogues immediately return.  
In order for this to work, the soldiers would have to stay until a village was completely 
capable of defending itself, or until they are no longer needed; this is why many 
pacification programs have failed.   
The previous COG, Self-Justification, and this one, Seeds of Hatred, both 
place a premium on social influence tactics that are focused on reconciliation.  
Reconciliation is extremely important in environments such as those the CAP 
experienced (villages) where atrocities were common and sometimes unavoidable and 
included family, neighbors, and close friends.  A focus on both of these COGs can help 
the planner to develop a way to address the fact that the close geographic concentration 
of combat between villages, tribes, and families, during COIN operations  brings about a 
fundamental issue of how to influence them to get along. 
8. COG 8:  Psychological Reactance 
“Coercive influence creates resentment and rebellion.”137 
Psychological reactance occurs when a person feels their freedoms are threatened.  
It is that motivation that occurs within the individual to restore their lives or freedoms 
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back to how they were before they were threatened.  It is human nature to respond to 
reactance, and even though they vary, responses generally are an oppositional response 
(in which the target attempts to do the opposite of the fear arousing pressures), or an 
attempt to directly eliminate the threat to freedom.  Psychological reactance can be used 
in propaganda campaigns to convince the target that their freedoms are being taken away 
by the enemy with the goal of having the target conduct attacks on them.138 
Many of the resettlement programs conducted in South Vietnam caused reactance 
and a hatred of the U.S.  The strategic hamlet program, for example, oftentimes involved 
relocating villagers to fortified sites.  The idea was that the villagers would be free from 
VC harassment and they would not be influenced to support or join the VC.  Additionally 
this program intended to starve the VC of its most valuable resource, the people. 
However, many villagers resented having to move from their ancestral villages and were 
threatened by the coercive measures used by the government.  It was so unpopular with 
the people that it had a reverse effect and many of the villagers involved with the 
strategic hamlet program ended up joining the NLF, or VC.139    
On the other hand, the CAP attempted to decrease reactance by purposefully not 
taking away the villagers freedoms.  By not blatantly interfering with their freedoms, the 
CAP was able to create an environment where they were not threatened by the U.S. 
presence, but more so by the enemy-the VC. 
9. COG 9:  The Fog of Propaganda 
“Misperceptions and distortions of information are common in conflicts including 
wars.”140 
The fog of propaganda can produce the following three effects: 1) Rumors can 
determine the targets behavior; 2) Confusing or ambiguous actions are usually interpreted 
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within the war frame; 3) The fog or war can affect decision makers.141 The CAP concept 
addresses all three of these.  They allow for quick assessment of rumors, which creates 
the opportunity for a quick rebuttal if necessary.  CAP breaks the war frame by showing 
that the U.S. is on the Vietnam side and not just there as imperialists.  In the CAP, the 
decision maker is right there with the people, in the village, close to the rumors and 
reality, so the anti-U.S. frames can be easily countered.  By placing the decision maker in 
the village, they were able to lessen the fog. 
CAP leaders demonstrated the understanding of the importance of limiting 
distortions of information, and planned for it extensively.  Prior to insertion of a platoon, 
the area was psychologically prepared with PSYOPs via leaflets and loudspeakers that 
described the CAP.  After insertion, major PSYOPs themes were introduced and after a 
few days of observing targets, sensitive anti-VC propaganda could be introduced (see 
Figure 9).142  Once security was established and a sense of trust created, the Marines 
were able to begin controlling the fog of propaganda.  
 
Figure 9.   Insertion Plan (From 1st CAG Chronology NOV 1968)143 
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Combined Action Group command chronologies provide additional examples of 
the CAP controlling the information received and thereby limiting the fog of propaganda.  
Televisions and radios were placed in strategic households, which made PRO-GVN 
propaganda more available.144  This worked because of the way the villages socialized.  
Not all villagers were able to get information from outside sources, so they depended on 
social interaction for outside information.  The CAP Marines ensured the propaganda  
they received was PRO-GVN by jamming the electromagnetic spectrum and taking 
control frequency bands.  This way, the only information coming over the airways to the 
villagers was PRO-GVN.145 
B. CENTERS OF GRAVITY SUMMARY 
Pratkanis developed the nine COGs for social influence campaigns in international 
conflict for a traditional state on state war.  This analysis takes these COGs and applies them 
in the context of a counterinsurgency.  The biggest difference between their initial intention 
and this application is the extreme importance of : 
a) The emphasis of Psychology of the Inevitable.  This COG plays a far more 
important role in COIN operations than traditional warfare because of the importance of 
winning over the population that comes with defeating an insurgency.  Populations tend to 
support whichever side they believe is going to win and therefore it is essential to convince 
them that the defeat of the insurgents will bring them peace and some sort of consistency in 
their lives.      
b) Reconciliation.  This not one of Pratkanis’ identified COGs, but as stated above 
plays a major role in both COGs 6 (Self Justification) and 7 (Seeds of Hatred) due to the 
nature of COIN warfare.  Based on the reality that such close warfare sometimes puts 
families, friends, and neighbors in conflict with each other, reconciliation should possibly be 
considered an additional COG.   
The following chapter builds on these COGs and identifies select individual social 
influence tactics that should be considered when conducting COIN operations.       
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VI. SOCIAL INFLUENCE TACTICS USED IN SOUTH VIETNAM  
The social influence tactics presented throughout this study are based on 
scientifically tested sociological and psychological theories that have been studied for 
years, some for centuries.  They have been applied and tested in many environments, 
including everyday social settings, college campuses, law enforcement, fraud cases, and 
more recently, military operations.146  The following is a brief list of individual tactics 
that could be applied to COIN operations in order to provide an advantage to the war 
fighter.  This chapter defines the tactics, discusses why they work, identifies possible 
threats, and (if applicable) provides an example of its use either by the CAP or against the 
CAP by the VC.            
A. ALTERCASTING 
Altercasting is a tactic that places a target in a specific social role with the goal of 
that target behaving socially in accordance with the desired role.147  There are many 
forms of altercasting, all of which are defined by the specific role.  One, the Authority—
Agent Altercast, is when someone who is or appears to be an authority casts the target 
into the role of being an agent of that authority figure, resulting in obedience to 
authority.148 Another, the Expert—Unknowing Public Altercast, uses an expert (e.g., 
doctor, lawyer, or nuclear engineer) to cast the recipient of a message as someone not “in 
the know” thus requiring the expert for the information.149  The important aspect of an 
altercast is that the target believes in their role and behaves as such. 
1. Why It Works 
Altercasting works because it places a target into a social role, and once a person 
accepts that role, a number of social pressures are brought to bear to insure the role is 
                                                 
146 Cone, Rayfield, and Stach, “Integrating Social Influence Tactics Into Contemporary Military 
Operations.” 
147 Anthony R. Pratkanis, “Altercasting as an influence tactic.,” 202. 
148 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 32. 
149 Ibid., 33. 
 50
enacted.  These pressures include expectations, and the formation of an identity that 
provides the actors with a stake in a given social system.  The effectiveness of an 
influence attempt depends on what roles are invoked and whether or not the target fully 
accepts the role they are placed in.150    
2. Potential Threats to Altercasting 
The biggest risk to altercasting occurs when the target does not assume the role 
intended for them.151  The most common reason for this would be if the role that the 
target is placed in is counter to the norms of their culture.   
3. CAP Example 
 In order to maintain control of the situation, the CAPs would have to altercast the 
Vietnamese with whom they were working with into a role.  A role the CAPs put the PFs 
in was “an effective agent for their own security.”  CPL Roosevelt Johnson explains how 
this worked: 
Our PF platoon 132, have become quite effective.  For the latest operation, 
they went out themselves and collected all the intel they could and then 
they came back to our compound, and they sit there and they worked up 
all the plans down to each detail.  They told how much ammo they 
wanted, what time they wanted to hit, and everything.  The only thing the 
Marines had to do was coordinate the air support and go with them for 
morale booster because they figure we were working together.152  
This action that was planned by the PFs, who, at the time the Marines arrived 
were not even considered a military outfit, recorded twenty VC killed.  The PFs 
had become “an effective agent for their own security.” 
B. COALITION FORMATION AND DISRUPTION 
Coalition Formation is based on the idea that two or more individuals or groups 
will join together when in competition with other individuals or groups.  Whichever 
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coalition achieves the most critical resources becomes the more attractive and winning 
group.153  Conversely, coalition disruption seeks to destroy or neutralize coalitions 
advantageous to the adversary.  Influence campaigns can be tailored to create beneficial 
coalitions or disrupt those that do not support the objective. 
1. Why It Works 
Coalition Formation works through the pooling of resources (votes, money, arms, 
information, public opinion, etc.).  Coalition formation can create a situation that allows 
for a typically peaceful resolution to conflicting interests between groups or individuals.  
When one group can not get what it wants, it must find some common ground with 
another group in order to achieve an objective over a third party. Coalitions can create  
bonds and interpersonal relationships that can move beyond the situation at hand and 
provide means to achieve other objectives.154  Coalition disruption is designed to thwart 
the pooling of resources.   
2. Potential Threats to Coalition Formation and Disruption 
Potential threats to coalition formation and disruption include:  
a) Developing a coalition that lacks power to achieve objectives.   
b) Selection of coalition partners that exclude other potential partners who  
  could be useful in achieving objectives. 
c) Weak coalitions are easily divided by the adversary.155  
3. CAP Example 
In Vietnam, there were three principle participants—the GVN/U.S., the VC/NVA, 
and the villagers.  The object of both the GVN and the VC was to gain the trust and 
support of the villagers who ultimately controlled the fate of whether or not the country 
fell under communist rule.  Whichever group could prove to be more successful at 
forming a coalition with the villagers would ultimately be in control of the resources and 
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that would lead to their goal (U.S./GVN—noncommunist, VC/NVA—communist).  
Additionally there were many smaller, yet equally as pertinent, coalitions at play in South 
Vietnam. 
The CAP concept provided an excellent opportunity for coalition formation from 
the U.S./GVN perspective.  The most provocative resources that could be offered to the 
villagers came in the way of security and economic stability.  Those are exactly what the 
CAP offered.  Security was provided by living within the villages and keeping the VC 
out.  Economic stability resulted from both the security provided to the farmers, the 
commodity handouts,156 new projects, and supplies that were given to the villagers to 
help them become more efficient at their trades.157  These handouts and projects can be 
viewed as providing the necessary resources in an attempt to gain trust and form a 
coalition with the villagers. 
Without the support of the entire military effort in Vietnam (MACV), the CAP 
had an issue with threat (a), in that it lacked power to achieve objectives.  Oftentimes 
they were able to form a mutually beneficial coalition with the villagers, which helped to 
achieve their own objectives.  However, these coalitions did little to benefit the overall 
objectives of the U.S. in Vietnam because the CAP was never fully supported by leaders 
of the Army or the JCS.158 
C. COMMITMENT TRAP 
Commitment is defined as the binding of an individual to a behavior or course of 
action.  Once a person becomes identified with a certain behavior, it is hard for that 
person to behave in a way that counters it.  Once a commitment is secured, the likelihood 
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that the target will comply and perform that behavior increases.  This works as an 
influence tactic because breaking of the commitment creates a feeling of failure or not 
living up to one’s promises.159  
1. Why It Works 
When behavior is visible, irreversible, and perceived to be freely chosen, 
commitments are the strongest.  Breaking that commitment produces a tension of not 
living up to promises within the individual and leads to loss of trust and consistency.160 
2. Potential Threats to Commitment Trap 
The biggest threat to Commitment Trap is the chance that the target could fall into 
a trap, which escalates commitment to a failing course of action.  Once this occurs, it is 
difficult to reverse because of the psychological implications of breaking a 
commitment.161 
3. CAP Example  
On June 10, 1966, a dozen Marines arrived in the village of Binh Nghia.  After 
meeting with police chief Lam, it was decided that they would build a fort in the village 
to allow them to patrol and provide 24-hour security for the people.  Lam was determined 
to keep the Marine presence in the village.  The only problem was the Marines could not 
get building supplies for weeks and would not be able to stay until they could set up some 
sort of shelter.  “Unfazed, Lam said they could build their own defenses without outside 
help.”162  He soon called a meeting with the villagers, explained that the Marines were 
there to stay, and requested help to build the fort.  That day the combined force of the 
Marines and Lam’s PFs, along with the villagers set to work and built a fort, sunk a well, 
and provided food to the Marines.163   
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Commitment Trap dictates that since the villagers assisted the Marines in building 
their fort, in the future it should be hard for them to behave in a way that is not consistent 
with helping out the Marines.     
D. EFFORT JUSTIFICATION 
Effort Justification is a tactic in which the target is required to expend large 
amounts of effort to obtain an object.  It works through the process of self justification 
that is created by an increased liking of the object.164  Essentially the more personal 
interest a person has in an object or effort, the more likely they are to defend it. 
1. Why It Works 
This tactic works though two processes, self-justification, and, humans have an 
effort heuristic (or rule)—the more effort it takes to produce an object, the higher that 
object is rated in terms of quality and liking .  It has been shown that people consider 
themselves reasonable and are able to self-justify their actions as being viable.  
Additionally, the mere expectation of having to expend effort can also produce a positive 
attitude change.165 
2. Potential Threats to Effort Justification 
Conducting this tactic creates the risk that if the effort required to achieve the 
objection is too high, the target may not put forth any effort at all.  Conversely, if the 
effort required is too low, the target may think nothing is going to come of it, or they may 
become suspicious to the tactic.  In either case, the influence agent must be aware of that 
too much or too little level of effort can cause suspicions to their intent and affect further 
influence opportunities.166 
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3. CAP Example 
Since Effort Justification for the most part plays on an individual’s internal 
emotions, it can be difficult to obtain buy-in.  The buy-in the Marines desired from the 
villagers was support for the GVN and resistance to the communist north.  Aside from the 
civic action programs (discussed in the previous chapter) that were set up to provide the 
villagers with supplies and have them build infrastructure themselves, there were some 
other programs set up that could have produced the process of self-justification needed to 
increase (at least internally) the like fullness of the GVN.   
 
Figure 10.   Information Program Leaflet (From Chandler, 1981)167 
Figure 10 shows a leaflet that was used throughout South Vietnam to encourage 
the villagers to both provide information on the VC, and in some cases turn in ordnance 
for rewards.  This program provided results; in the month of November, 1968, 1st CAG 
reported 32 separate cases of volunteer information and 13 cases of ordnance being 
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turned in.168  The effort expended by the villagers who came forth with information or 
ordnance could have created an environment where an effort justification situation 
became prevalent contributing to a increased liking of the GVN.   
E. EMPATHY 
Empathy consists of two aspects: a cognitive awareness of another person’s 
internal states (thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions) and a vicarious affective 
response of concern and distress for another person. 
1. Why It Works 
An individual is more likely to take an interest in helping another individual, or 
complying with a request from them, when they feel empathy towards their mental or 
physical well-being.  It is even more effective when there is a working relationship with 
the target.  Empathy can be useful in gaining conformity and causing actions consistent 
with the influence agent’s goals.169 
2. Potential Threats to Empathy 
If the target feels that the influence agent is responsible for creating the state of 
distress, or helplessness of the victim, this tactic can backfire.  When this occurs it can 
create a situation where the target will ignore any attempts at compliance. Another risk 
exists if there is no way for the target to solve the problems or help reduce the amount of 
distress in the victim, the agent must provide a solution.170   
3. CAP Example   
The fact that the Marines worked and lived with the PFs created a situation of 
empathy between the Marines and both the PFs and the villagers.  “The Marines saw too 
much of the villagers and worked too closely with them, not to be affected by their 
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personal grief.”171  The Marines patrols with the PFs also raised concerns amongst the 
villagers about the well being of their new friends and relatives.   
The intimacy and close knit relations created by living so close, just as in any 
neighborhood or family environment, causes the empathy that can be exploited to one’s 
advantage.    
F. FAIT ACCOMPLI: CREATING A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE 
INEVITABLE 
The “Fait Accompli” tactic is the process that instills in a target the belief that a 
certain course of action is inevitable and nothing that can be done to prevent it.  This 
tactic induces the target to believe that the course of action is their fate, and by nature 
they come to accept it, and oftentimes even like it.172  
1. Why It Works 
This tactic works because once the target audience accepts the inevitability of an 
outcome; he or she reconciles them self to that new reality and may also become 
convinced that the end result is acceptable, or even beneficial.173 
2. Potential Threats to Creating a Psychology of the Inevitable 
Creating a Psychology of the Inevitable creates the potential for damaging 
credibility and/or reinvigorating the opposition. If the target is not totally sold on the 
inevitability of the story or the advertised outcome, credibility could be affected.  
Additionally, the adversary may be reinvigorated by the challenge created by the initial 
“Fait Accompli” statement.174 
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3. CAP Example  
A problem the Marines faced was convincing the villagers that they would not 
face VC retribution for assisting their cause.  Some villagers, by nature (self-
preservation), were supporting the VC through intelligence and early warning of planned 
patrols because of the fear of VC retribution.  The new police chief Nguyen Thang Thanh 
(took over after Lam’s death) realized the need to put an end to his village’s support for 
the VC.  He knew he needed to convince the villagers that the VC defeat was coming.  
He spread the word throughout the village that “A villager could continue to work for the 
Viet Cong, but he was now put on notice that that penalty could be death.”175   
Sending this message to the villagers created a psychology of the inevitable.  In 
other words, the villagers were coerced, or forced, into believing in the ability of the 
platoon to stop VC influence.   
The VC was extremely effective at creating a psychology of the inevitable as 
well.  In its propaganda campaign in the south they would note that the U.S. seems 
powerful, but there is no need to fear it because its forces are constantly being defeated 
by the Liberation Army.  The VC would report victories and enemy losses even if they 
were made up.  The theme of its messages was “the U.S. efforts are the last gasp of a 
dying conspiracy, so there is neither a moral nor a practical reason to support the losing 
and desperate Americans and their puppets.”176 
G. FEAR APPEALS 
A fear appeal creates a fear by linking undesired actions with negative 
consequences, or desired actions with the avoidance of a negative outcome.177  In order 
for fear to be effective in changing attitudes and behavior, it must arouse intense fear, 
offer a specific recommendation for overcoming the fear, and the target must believe they 
can perform the recommendation.178   
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1. Why It Works 
Normally, fear reduces a person’s cognitive capacity and invokes a natural 
avoidance tendency to distance themselves from negative, dangerous, or harmful actions. 
Fear is fairly easy to generate and control, which makes it an appealing influence tactic to 
use.  The effective influence agent provides a way to cope with the fear and this course of 
action, if aligned with the goals of the agent, is easy for the target to choose when faced 
with immense fear.179 
2. Potential Threats to Fear Appeals 
The three threats a influence agent must be aware of when attempting to use fear 
appeals in an influence campaign are: 
a)  If the risks associated with fear appeal include making the fear so great that the 
target sees no alternative solution available, they may act in denial in order to cope with 
the fear emotion.  This can occur when there is no perceived doable coping response to 
the fear.  
b) A fear appeal can always be countered with a more dangerous fear factor that 
overshadows or replaces the influence effort. 
c) Continued use of fear can cause fatigue and may wear-out a target audience and 
may result in withdrawal. 
d) Fear that is not consistent with what the target observes can reduce 
credibility.180  
3. CAP Example 
Fear Appeals are evident in nearly all military campaigns.  In a COIN situation 
similar to what the CAP was involved in, it is easy to conduct influence campaigns using 
fear appeals.  A problem with this ease is that because fear is such a strong emotion, it is 
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just as easy for the other side to counter it with a fear tactic of their own.  This happened 
often during the Vietnam War with both sides using fear to influence the villagers. 
The VC used fear extensively and was extremely effective using it to influence 
the villagers.  This description of some of the tactics they used comes from Sergeant 
Robert Ashe, who was stationed in La Chau hamlet.   
The people around La Chau are afraid of the Marines.  The VC tell them 
we’re gonna kill them or rape their wives.  The VC blew up a civilian bus 
with a pressure mine down on the next crossroads and killed forty people.  
One of the wounded civilians started running away.  He later said he was 
afraid of the Americans.181   
Their effectiveness not only caused the villagers to fear the VC, but to fear the Marines 
because of what would happen to them.     
H. INNUENDO 
An innuendo is a subtle or hidden suggestion of a fact usually concerning an 
individual’s, or group’s, reputation or character.  Oftentimes, innuendos play a part in 
determining how a person views events or other people.182 
1. Why It Works 
Innuendo drives people to develop their own opinions about a person, event, or 
policy based on the suggestion of fact (by the innuendo), which may or may not be true.  
It creates an opportunity for future influence by creating expectations that can be used to 
filter future information to the target to process.183  
2. Potential Threats to Innuendo 
The biggest threat to using Innuendo as an influence tactic is the chance that the 
community discovers that the subtle suggestion is untrue.  This can lead to credibility 
issues for the influence agent, and once credibility is lost, it is hard to regain.  The 
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influence agent must understand the social standing and reputation of the target (whether 
it be a person, group, or policy) amongst the community, or risk that community’s 
emotional defense of the target.184 
3. CAP Example    
The VC was an expert at using rumors and innuendo to advance their cause.  For 
example, in August 1968, when Americans fired on a friendly hamlet after being 
ambushed by the VC, killing several civilians; an immediate campaign was conducted by 
the VC that caused anger and distrust in regards to the U.S. troops.  They spread rumors 
that the “foreign troops” had fired without provocation and were “no better than the 
French.”185  
This example is a direct attack on the credibility of the U.S. effort, and at the 
same time advances the strategy of the VC of claiming the U.S. are just continuing on 
with their “French Imperialistic ways.”  Given that the VC was using this strategy, as will 
other adversaries, it requires counter tactics, such as DRDR, Stealing Thunder, and 
Forewarning to be used.186   
I. JIGSAWING 
Jigsawing, or creating mutual interdependence, is a tactic that landscapes the 
situation in order to promote intergroup harmony and positive social relations.  It has 
been shown through experiments that by creating mutual interdependence, having two 
groups work together on common goals, intergroup conflict can be minimized.187  
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1. Why It Works 
Jigsawing creates an environment where people realize that they must work 
together in order to get what they want.  The mutual dependency created among the 
members of a group works to help accomplish a common goal that can be perceived by 
the individual as the achievement of individual goals.  This process includes the 
additional benefits of mutual respect and understanding between the group members.188 
2. Potential Risks to Jigsawing 
The most dangerous risk to Jigsawing is the chance that the groups placed 
together have such strong emotions towards each other that they either completely resist, 
or become violent with each other.  Additionally, the groups actions must be 
interdependent, and they must be supplied with proper materials and enough support 
from authorities to ensure progress.189   
3. CAP Example 
Documented success using Jigsawing has been achieved in classroom and office 
settings where the influence agent has almost constant supervision over progress.  For it 
to work in military operations, the influence agent also must be present.  This is why 
Jigsawing should be considered in COIN operations (where the agent is close and 
available), and was thought of by the CAP as stated by an organizer of CAP units CAPT 
R. E. Wiliamson. 
Combined action represents a viable alternative for a variety of reasons.  
By combining a mutually desired goal-local security-with the opportunity 
for Marines and Vietnamese to work together toward that goal, a sense of 
partnership is created, and identity of purpose.  Respect for the integrity of 
local command structures and preservation of local unit identity permits 
both esprit de Corps and a community pride to develop.190   
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J. NORM OF RECIPROCITY 
Norm of Reciprocity as an influence tactic relies on the idea that when a person 
does a favor for another, that person (who received the favor) feels obligated to return the 
favor.  Although it may vary with the time and place, the norm of reciprocity make two 
interrelated demands; people should help those who have helped them, and people should 
not hurt those who have helped them.  The norm of reciprocity is extremely strong in 
some societies.  For example, in the Philippines, if a man pays his compadre’s (extended 
family system in the Filipino culture) doctors bill in a time of need, the latter may be (or 
feel) obligated to get that man’s son an important job.  In societies such as this, most all 
relations are guided by the norm of reciprocity.191  
1. Why It Works 
Norm of Reciprocity works because society has created a norm that when a gift or 
favor is received, it should be reciprocated. Because of this, individuals feel compelled to 
return the favor in order to fulfill his or her role in society, rather than suffer internal 
guilt.   
2. Potential Threats to Norm of Reciprocity 
There are many threats to using the Norm of Reciprocity, including: 
a) “The credibility of the influence agent can be damaged if the target begins to 
feel manipulated by the exchange of gifts, favors, or actions. 
b) Gifts or actions on the part of the target that are not returned by the influence 
agent can have a negative impact on the influence relationship. Any noncompliance on 
the part of the influence agent can be seen as not meeting socially acceptable criteria and 
create a backlash effect.  
c) The relationship between influence agent and target can become one of 
dependency (of the target on the agent) that can foster resentment of the agent by the 
target. This dependency is created if the gift or favor is viewed as being bestowed from a 
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superior as opposed from an equal. The dependency status makes the target feel inferior 
and either unable to effectively return in kind to the source of influence or resentful for 
the status.”192 
3. CAP Example 
Anytime people live closely with one another and have daily interactions, the 
chances for implementation of the Norm of Reciprocity are present.  For example, CPL 
Joseph Trainor points out: 
About five times a week, the squad leaders had to go out to weddings, and 
funerals.  Almost every day of the week we have to go out and eat with the 
people at some sort of celebrations, for everything, and they always want 
Marines there to show that they are welcome to whatever is going on.  
Myself, I’ve been to inaugurations, weddings, and wakes.  They really 
want you to take part.193  
This example is more of the results that come from using the Norm of 
Reciprocity.  Any gift given to the village from a Marine creates compliance, and the 
same for gifts given from the village to the Marines.  Once this process begins, a 
relationship is created and results in invitations as mentioned above.  The openness of the 
villagers and the fact that they invited the Marines into their homes and to their social 
functions could be a result of feeling of indebtedness to them for providing them (the 
villagers) security from the VC, as the Norm of Reciprocity predicts.   
K.  PROJECTION 
Projection is a more specific form of innuendo in which the influence agent 
accuses another person or group of the negative traits and behaviors that the agent 
possesses and exhibits in an attempt to draw attention from their own misdeeds.   
1. Why It Works 
Projection works for a number of reasons including:  
                                                 
192 Cone, Rayfield, and Stach, “Integrating Social Influence Tactics Into Contemporary Military 
Operations,” 196–197. 
193 Trainor, “CPL Joseph A. Trainor, No. 2202-2341-3c, Oral History Collection, History and 
Museum Collection, HQMC.” 
 65
a) People tend not to suspect that others may be attempting to deceive.  
b) Most people are reluctant to expose lies and thus the projectionist gets away 
with it.  
c) Projection gives the perception that the projectionist is concerned about moral 
behavior. 
d) Projection diverts attention away from any flaws in the character and behavior 
of the projectionist. 
e) Once the misinformation of projection is accepted, it serves to guide future 
perceptions and beliefs that can then reinforce the original misinformation.194 
2. Potential Risks to Projection 
Projection is an extremely strong tactic that plays on the target’s emotions.  The 
biggest risk involved with projection occurs when it is not countered.  It is oftentimes 
used by authoritarian regimes, and therefore democracies like the U.S. must be aware of 
it and be prepared to use counter tactics.195  Also, like other deceitful tactics, projection 
can lead to loss of credibility if it is shown to be untrue.196   
3. CAP Example 
Projection is not a tactic that is widely used by the U.S., however, the U.S. must 
always be prepared to counter accusations.  For example, the VC used this tactic 
extensively.  In many cases, the VC would use projection to shift blame from their 
misdeeds (e.g., killing civilians, burning a village) to the Marines.   All the U.S. could do 
was hope to recognize it, and then refute or counter the claims with other tactics.     
 
                                                 
194 Cone, Rayfield, and Stach, “Integrating Social Influence Tactics Into Contemporary Military 
Operations,” 225. 
195 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 18-82. Tactics such as Inoculation, Stealing Thunder, 
and Damn It, Refute It, Damn It, Replace It,  are effective counter tactics and are covered in Chapter 2 of 
The Science of Social Influence. 
196 Cone, Rayfield, and Stach, “Integrating Social Influence Tactics Into Contemporary Military Operations,” 
226–227. 
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L. SELF EFFICACY 
Self Efficacy is a tactic that can be used to change a target’s high-risk, defensive, 
and anxiety-producing behavior.  It involves increasing the target’s belief about their own 
capability to accomplish tasks or objectives.197     
1. Why It Works 
It works because it creates an expectation of success based on the individual’s 
perceived capability to be successful to accomplish stated goals acquired through 
training, guidance, and encouragement from the influence agent. 
2. Potential Risks to Self Efficacy 
The risks associated with Self Efficacy are:  
a) The influence agent changes the goals or objective after self efficacy is created 
within the target.198 
b) The target is unable to achieve the goal or objective after self efficacy is 
created. 
3. CAP Example 
In operations like those faced by the CAP it is important, even necessary, to create 
a belief among the peoples that they can defend themselves.  If not, the counter-
insurgents will never be able to leave.   
In some instances, the training and the constant patrols the Marines conducted 
with the PFs instilled a sense of belief that the PFs could in fact defend their villages 
from the VC.  The following is an excerpt from a Marine Headquarters handout regarding 
the Platoon in Binh Nghia village that was given to high ranking officers and members of 
the press: 
                                                 
197 Pratkanis, The Science of Social Influence, 56. 
198 Cone, Rayfield, and Stach, “Integrating Social Influence Tactics Into Contemporary Military 
Operations,” 247. 
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The PFs are now confident of their fighting proficiency and realize they 
are quite capable of denying enemy access to their hamlet.  In short, they 
have come to realize the VC can be beaten and that they are capable of 
doing it.199 
Whether or not the PFs actually were confident in their ability is only one part of 
this message.  By making this information public the Marines are targeting many groups.  
 a) The PFs—Increasing their own belief, setting an expectation that they 
can really defend themselves. 
 b) The Villagers—Setting the expectation that the PFs can defend them so 
they no longer need to worry (anxiety producing behavior) about the VC. 
 c) The VC—They might think twice before heading into Binh Nghia after 
news such as this spreads.  
Many of these tactics can be used together or as compliments to each other to 
achieve one’s influence goals.  The influence agent should be competent in their 
application and risks prior to attempting the use them against a target.  The following 
table is to be used as a tool to help the influence campaign planner determine what tactics 
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VII.  SUMMARY 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The CAP concept was for the most part successful in depriving insurgent access 
to the villages, teaching the PFs how to fight, bringing out the good will of the villagers 
towards the Marines, and sometimes even the government.  If fully backed and 
implemented, the CAP could have changed the course of the war by winning the hearts 
and minds of the villagers.   
The SIA portion of this thesis helped bring forward the idea that social influence 
plays a major role in military operations, especially those involving close contact with 
civilians from another country like COIN does.  As discussed in previous chapters, the 
most important COGs to consider during COIN operations are: COG 6—Self 
Justification and COG 7 - Seeds of Hatred because of the unique situation involved when 
combatants are sometimes related to one another.  Additionally, reconciliation must be 
addressed when addressing the fact that relatives and neighbors are sometimes fighting 
each other.      
Table 1 emerged after careful study into the individual tactics of social influence.  
This table is not the “be all know all” of social influence tactics applicable to COIN 
operations.  Rather, a starting point for further research that could develop this table into 
a “pocket guide” to social influence tactics for participants in an influence campaign 








Table 1.   Situation/Tactic Matrix 
Situation   
Tactics                        
Agenda Setting Altercast Coalition 
Formation 
Commitment Trap Control the Flow of 
Information 











X X   X  X  
Civilian support  is 
leaning towards 
insurgents  X X X  X  X X 





X X   X   X 
Civilians do not 
support your 
presence.        X 
Convincing 
civilians you are 
going to stay. X       X 
Native forces are 
engaged in the 
fight. X X X X X X X X 
Sending the 
message that “we 
are on your side” 
and not imperialists.   
X X X X X X X X 
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Table 1 (Cont.). Situation/Tactic Matrix
Situation            
Tactics                      
Fear Appeals Innuendo Jigsawing Norm of Reciprocity Psychological 
Reactance 

















X X   X  X X 
Civilian support  
leaning towards 
insurgents  
 X     X X 





X X    X X X 
Civilians do not 
support your 
presence.   X X  X X X 
Convincing 
civilians you are 
going to stay.    X     
Native forces are 
engaged in the 
fight. X X   X X X  
Sending the 
message that “we 
are on your side” 
and not 
imperialists.   
 X X X   X  
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B. APPLYING A CAP CONCEPT TODAY 
The CAP concept need not be Vietnam specific.  If cultural and situational 
similarities are considered during implementation, it is a highly flexible tactic that can be 
used in today’s conflicts.  The CAP can be useful in COIN operations as long as: the 
program receives recognition as a national strategy, the local forces are trained with the 
CAP forces before being put in a combat situation, the CAP forces are trained in cross 
cultural communication, the CAP forces are trained on the social influence tactics 
discussed in this study. 
Recognition as a national strategy, means the strategy is implemented with a top 
down approach with support from not only specific service, but top military leaders.  One 
of the reasons the CAP in Vietnam did not become a tactic used by the U.S. as a whole 
was the reluctance of the Army, and the JCS to adopt it as a viable tactic to lead to 
accomplishment of the overall strategy in Vietnam. 
Training the local forces with the CAP prior to combat would ensure that both the 
CAP soldiers and the local forces are on the same page.  In Vietnam, it took many 
months and hundreds of patrols before the combined team actually became a legitimate 
force.  A period of training consisting of weapons familiarization, patrol tactics, and force 
structure would reduce this period, increasing the efficiency of the combined team.  
Cross cultural communication is necessary anytime foreign forces are going to 
live within another population.  The military today handles this well as evidenced by the 
number of soldiers who attend mandatory language and culture programs at the Defense 
Language Institute in Monterey, CA, prior to duty in foreign countries.     
As this study demonstrates, social influence plays an integral role in the success 
of military operations that involve close contact with the population of a foreign country.  
Training soldiers on the basics of applying social influence tactics in an operational 
environment will benefit both the mission and the soldier.  The Marines in Vietnam did 




way.  If today’s soldier could be trained (even just a familiarization course) on the 
science of social influence before participating in COIN operations, he will be better 
equipped for success. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Additional Research on the Social Influence Tactics Used by the Viet 
Cong 
While conducting research on the CAP, several instances of the VCs use of the 
science of social influence were discovered.  This thesis only touched on a handful of 
them.  A complete Social Influence Analysis on their tactics could provide useful data, 
and an insight into what tactics were used to counter the U.S.’s, and provide additional 
tactics that are applicable to COIN operations. 
2. Research on What Requirements or Standards Are Necessary to 
Educate Today’s Soldier in the Field of Operational Social Influence 
While conducting research, many instances were identified where CAP leaders 
and Marines noted that cultural training was lacking.  Today before heading into a 
foreign country, training is essentially the same as it was during Viet Nam; a quick 
language course, and a day or two on customs; this just does not cut it.  To be successful, 
the soldier needs more than this, and if COIN operations are involved (as most conflicts 
today) an understanding of the science of social influence in the context of cross cultural 
communications should be mandatory.  A recommendation is a school taught by a CAP 
expert (Nagl, for example), locals (Afghan civilians, if, by chance the soldiers are headed 
to Afghanistan for operations), and a Social Psychologist.  Having a schoolhouse headed 
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